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THE GNMA SECURITIES MARKET: AN
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS FOR A
REGULATORY SCHEME
I. Introduction
In the mid-1960's, efforts to increase and stabilize the supply of
residential mortgage credit to attract a broader base of investors
and capture a portion of the financial resources traditionally in-
vested in the security and bond markets led to the development of
the Government National Mortgage Association Mortgage-Backed
Securities ("MBS") program. In 1968 Congress created the Gov-
ernment National Mortgage Association ("GNMA" or Ginnie Mae)
through an amendment to Title III of the National Housing Act.'
GNMA exists as a corporate instrumentality within the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") whose purpose
it is to assume certain functions of the Federal National Mortgage
Association ("FNMA") which could not be carried out in the pri-
vate market.2 The Housing and Urban Development Act of 19688
amended the National Housing Act by adding section 306(g)
which authorized GNMA to guarantee timely payment of principal
and interest (plus prepayment and foreclosure proceeds) on securi-
ties backed by a trust or pool of qualifying mortgages.5 GNMA's
guaranty is backed by the full faith and credit of the United States
Government.' The first series of GNMA-MBS 7 was issued in Feb-
1. National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 802, 82 Stat. 476 (1968) (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1717(a)(2)(A) (1976)).
2. There are presently two major GNMA programs. One is the purchase of mortgages to
support housing for low-income families for which private financing is not readily available.
The second major GNMA activity is its mortgage-backed securities program which has revo-
lutionized the secondary mortgage market. See S. REP. No. 91-392, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1524, 1533.
3. See 24 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1978).
4. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-1723 (1976).
5. The GNMA guarantees timely payment of principal and interest on securities based
on pools of government-underwritten mortgages and issued by private institutions, i.e. se-
curities collateralized by single-family, third year mortgages on one-to-one-unit dwellings.
U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, Analysis and Report on Alternative Ap-
proaches to Regulating the Trading of GNMA Securities 3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
HUD Report].
6. Accordingly, GNMA securities attract investors because they are considered highly
reliable. On the other hand, problems related to GNMA securities could cause a "ripple
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ruary 1970. To date, the total amount of Ginnie Maes issued is
approaching $100 billion; approximately one quarter of this aggre-
gate amount has been issued in the past year.8 As a result of this
ability to attract an increasing volume of non-traditional investors
into the residential mortgage market, the GNMA-MBS program
has aided in reducing the effect of cyclical fluctuations in the hous-
ing market and has tended to hold down mortgage interest rates.
Thus, the emergence of mortgage-backed, modified pass through
securities guaranteed by the Government National Mortgage Asso-
ciation has significantly improved the acceptance of mortgages as
an investment vehicle.
Presently, Ginnie Maes and transactions in the markets on
which they are traded are not regulated under the federal securi-
ties laws. As a result, trading abuses in the Ginnie Mae forward
market have arisen, posing a potentially serious risk to the entire
securities industry. If abuses in this market were to cause investors
to avoid the risk associated with trading in GNMA securities, the
impact on the availability of capital for housing would be most se-
rious. This Note will first explore the nature and scope of the
GNMA Securities market, and second, will discuss the legislative
framework for the overlapping jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission ("CFTC") over GNMA industry regulation.
In addition, this Note will highlight the evolution of alternative
regulatory responses of various government agencies, including the
CFTC and SEC, as well as the industry's proposals for self regula-
effect" that would spread to other kinds of U.S. securities and interfere with the finances of
the nation.
7. Throughout this Note the term "Ginnie Mae" will refer to the "modified pass
through" type securities guaranteed by the GNMA. This means that GNMA guarantees
that the holders of the securities will receive their respective shares of the regular monthly
principal and interest payment which are due and owing on the underlying mortgages, even
if the mortgage payments are in fact delinquent or the issuer fails to permit the payments to
the holders. All additional payments resulting from foreclosures or prepayments are also
passed through to holders immediately. See Boileau, GNMA Pass Through: Overwhelming
Success Story, 37 MORTGAGE BANKER 20 (1977).
8. Through the mortgage-backed securities program, it is estimated that financing has
been provided for nearly three million home purchases. GNMA estimates that more than
nine million Americans have lived in homes financed through the mortgage-backed securi-
ties program. Moreover, the GNMA program has been so successful in housing finance, that
it is setting the pattern for the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, the Federal Na-
tional Mortgage Association, and privately-issued mortgage-backed securities. Id.
[Vol. IX
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tion. Finally, in light of the fact that a comprehensive governmen-
tal regulatory pattern would require legislation, this Note reviews
the proposed legislation introduced on April 1, 1980 by Senator
Harrison Williams, Chairman of the Housing and Urban Affairs
Subcommittee to amend the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
This Note further reports on the proposals recently formulated by
a joint regulatory study of the government securities market un-
dertaken by the Treasury Department, Federal Reserve Board, and
SEC.
II. Nature and Scope of GNMA Securities Market
Pursuant to the 1968 HUD Act, GNMA's major functions may
be categorized generally as follows. First, under its management
and liquidating function, GNMA manages portfolios of federally-
owned mortgages originated by the Federal National Mortgage As-
sociation.' GNMA's second principal activity is its special assis-
tance function carried out through its mortgage purchase or "tan-
dem" programs. Under these programs, GNMA assists the housing
industry through commitments to mortgage lenders in times of
tight money. Accordingly, GNMA purchases certain types of Fed-
eral Housing Administration, Veteran Administration and conven-
tional mortgages in fulfillment of its statutory objectives to provide
support for the types of housing for which financing is scarce, such
as housing for low-income families, and to reverse declines in mort-
gage lending and housing construction. 10 Third, under its guaranty
function, GNMA operates the MBS program."
Specifically, each GNMA certificate represents a pro-rata share
in a pool of mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Authority
("FHA") or the Farmers Home Administration ("FmHA") or guar-
anteed by the Veterans Administration ("VA")."2 The mortgages in
a pool must all bear uniform interest rates and must have approxi-
mately the same date of maturity. Certificates are issued in an ag-
gregate principal amount equal to the total unpaid principal bal-
9. See 24 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1978).
10. In 1974, Congress authorized GNMA to operate a tandem plan for conventional
(non-FHA/VA) mortgages. National Housing Act of 1934, § 313, 12 U.S.C § 1723(e) (1976),
added by Emergency Home Purchase Assistance Act of 1974 § 3, Pub. L. No. 93-449, § 3(a),
88 Stat. 1364 (1974).
11. See 12 U.S.C. § 1721(g) (1976).
12. HUD Report, supra note 5, at 4.
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ances of mortgages in the pool.13 Moreover, ownership of these
securities, which are fully transferable, is registered by GNMA in
accordance with Treasury Department regulations."' Mortgages in
a pool of one-family mortgages are for thirty years."
GNMA certificates constitute "securities" within the meaning of
section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act")10 and
section 3(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934
Act").17 GNMA securities are exempt from the registration re-
quirements of the 1933 Act under section 3(a)(12) which exempts
"any security issued or guaranteed by the United States . ..or
any person controlled or supervised by and acting as an instrumen-
tality of the Government of the United States pursuant to author-
ity granted by Congress. 8 However, section 3(a)(12) of the 1934
13. The interest rates of the certificates are fixed at 0.5% below the interest rate of the
pooled mortgages. The differential is applied to the originators' servicing fees and GNMA's
guaranty fee. Id.
14. HUD Report, supra note 5, at 5. Certificates bearing the same interest rate are fully
fungible because of GNMA's pool composition requirements and because pooled mortgages
have similar amortization schedules. The mortgages themselves are transferred to a bank or
trust company to hold as a custodian. In the event of default in payment by the issuer of
securities, the mortgages are transferred to GNMA, which may then place them with an-
other lender to manage and service. Reflecting an extremely active secondary market, $41.9
billion of securities were transferred among registered holders during the fiscal year 1979, an
average of greater than $3 billion per month. It is reported that often dealers trade in the
secondary market without formal re-registration. Further, the number of active issuers at
the end of the fiscal year 1979 was 843, up 125 from the prior year. GNMA, Annual Report
6 (1979).
15. The great majority of securities issued have been collateralized by single family
mortgages, but multi-family project and mobile home loans have also been used. As of fiscal
year 1979, $22 billion mortgage-backed securities were guaranteed by GNMA. Constituting
the greatest amount ever guaranteed in a single year, the cumulative program rose to $84.5
billion according to the GNMA statistical breakdown of this total. $79.6 billion is in single-
family (level payment) securities, $2.8 billion in project and construction loan securities, $1
billion in the newly graduated payment securities, and $943 million in mobile home securi-
ties. Id.
Since experience has shown that they pay down faster, yield is often calculated as though
the certificates were to be paid on a regular monthly basis of principal and interest for
twelve years, with the remaining balance being paid off at the end of the 12th year. How-
ever, a pool may pay down faster or slower than this assumption. Speed of payment affects
the yield of the certificate.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(12) (1976).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1976). Under the 1933 Act, Ginnie Maes are exempted from §
5 registration requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1976). Issuers of Ginnie Maes are not required
to adhere to the formalities of registration with the SEC prior to public offering nor to
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Act also provides an exemption for U.S. guaranteed securities."0
Therefore, securities dealers who deal solely in Ginnie Maes and
other exempt securities need not register with the SEC. GNMA
securities are also exempt from the margin rules, for example, Reg-
ulation T of the Federal Reserve Board.2 Certain provisions of
federal securities law, notably the general antifraud provisions, are
applicable to any transactions in Ginnie Maes. GNMA securities
are not exempt from the anti-fraud rules of section 17(a)' 1 and sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act.'
GNMA securities are traded primarily over-the-counter by
securities dealers. Initially, GNMA purchasers were banks and say-
deliver a statutory prospectus to purchasers. Thus, an issuer is not subject to § 11 civil
liability arising from misstatements or omissions in a registration statement. 15 U.S.C. § 771
(1976).
Further, Ginnie Maes are exempted from the § 12(2) anti-fraud provisions, 15 U.S.c. §
77q(c) (1976). Thus, one who sells securities by means of untrue or misleading statements is
not subject to civil liability to the purchaser under this section of the Act.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1976).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78g-h (1976). Section 7 authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to limit the
amount of credit that may be extended on securities, specifically excluding exempted securi-
ties. Generally, the term margin refers to a deposit of cash or collateral by a client with his
broker (or by a broker with his clearinghouse) which provides a measure of protection to the
broker (or clearinghouse) in the event of adverse price movement on an open position cou-
pled with a default by the client (or broker). Margin in commodities is not a payment for
equity or down payment on the commodity itself but rather is in the nature of a perform-
ance bond or security deposit. The difference is significant because (a) both buyer and seller
post margin in commodities; (b) the remainder of the position is not being borrowed from
one's broker and does not require interest payments; and, (c) as price moves against one's
position, the account is debited and the protection represented by the initial margin may
fall below the prescribed maintenance level, in which case the trader will be required to post
additional margin. HUD Report, supra note 5, at 209.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1976). Under § 17, dealers who offer or sell Ginnie Maes by means
of fraudulent or untrue statements may be enjoined. Unless the courts implied the existence
of a private right of action for violation of § 17, only injunctive relief and criminal sanctions
are available. Criminal sanctions are provided for under § 24 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77x
(1976).
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240, 10b-5 (1980). Section 10b-5 makes it unlawful to engage in fraudu-
lent or deceptive acts or practices, or to make any untrue or misleading statements, in con-
nection with any purchase or sale of any security. See G.A. Thompson and Co. v. Wendell J.
Miller Mortgage Co., FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,668 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (private action); In
re Merrill Lynch, Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 11515, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,216 (1975).
The courts have recognized an implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5 for one
who purchases or sells securities and suffers damage as a result of a violation of the rule. See
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). However, the requirement of
scienter in a 10b-5 action since Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) has dimin-
ished the probability of recovery in such actions.
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ings and loan associations. Ginnie Maes were an attractive invest-
ment for these institutional purchasers, in part because Ginnie
Maes qualify as real estate assets and thus can be used by thrift
institutions to meet those real estate requirements which allow
special tax benefits. While banks and savings and loans associa-
tions remain the largest investors, there has been a significant in-
crease in credit union and pension and retirement fund participa-
tion23 as well as the development of mutual funds for individual
investors.24
Issuers of GNMA securities are predominantly mortgage bank-
ers.2 5 A mortgage banker originates mortgages primarily to estab-
lish a mortgage-servicing portfolio; he generally does not speculate
on interest rate shifts. Rather, he seeks to guarantee, at known
terms, his commitment to provide funds for the mortgages he
plans to acquire. A mortgage banker typically hedges against possi-
ble changes in interest rates by selling either mortgages or Ginnie
Maes for delayed delivery.26 A mortgage banker may not have
23. HUD Report, supra note 5, at 64.
24. These securities are attractive to investors with monthly cash flow needs. Ginnie
Maes are more palatable to investors than mortgages because they require no effort on the
part of the investor to search title, appraise value, establish creditworthiness, or deal with
other factors about which a direct investor in mortgages is normally concerned. G. OSBORNE,
G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 666 (1979).
25. HUD Report, supra note 5, at 8. In order to issue GNMA securities, the issuer must
first assemble the underlying pool. Only newly issued mortgages qualify for use in a GNMA
pool.
26. Id. at 28-29. Hedging involves
two or more contemporaneous transactions in which the same or similar securities or
commodities in which the risk of price movement is believed by the initiator (hedger)
to be reduced or changed. Hedging is common in futures, forward, and options trad-
ing strategies. A typical hedge might be for a speculator or investor to buy a security
for delivery three months away at a specified price and to sell the same security at
another price for forward delivery six months away. The investor who makes such a
transaction believes that the shorter or nearby contract will rise in price more rapidly
than the longer contract. His potential profit is the difference in the prices from his
original, or opening, transactions and his final, or closing, transactions. Other typical
hedges are taking an opposite position in the futures market to a position held in the
cash market to minimize the risk from adverse price changes, and taking a position in
the futures market as a temporary substitute for a cash transaction that will occur
later. Another type of hedge is for the producer of a commodity such as a mortgage
banker (who 'produces' mortgages which will be converted into Ginnie Mae pass
through securities) to make financial commitments to the mortgagee now and guaran-
tee a profit on the transaction by selling contracts to deliver Ginnie Mae pass through
securities at a future date when they become available.
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originated the mortgages being sold, because he may be unwilling
or unable to advance capital without assurance of a ready mar-
ket.27 Therefore, he sells to a dealer on a delayed-delivery basis
Ginnie Maes he reasonably intends to originate.2 8 A contract for
delayed delivery of Ginnie Maes constitutes a negotiated cash mar-
ket transaction in which two parties agree to the terms by which
they purchase and sell Ginnie Maes which are to be delivered at an
agreed future date. Such a contract is known as a delayed-delivery
or a forward contract.2
e
In the Ginnie Mae forward market, the dealer promptly resells
the Ginnie Maes which he has purchased to his customer shortly
after the dealer anticipates delivery from the mortgage banker.3 0
The delayed-delivery contract assures the mortgage banker of
maximum flexibility. It is an aid in keeping interest rates down
and an encouragement to the mortgage banker's increased partici-
pation in the GNMA market. 1
III. SEC/CFTC Overlapping Jurisdiction
The nature of the investment and general trading practices have
given rise to the GNMA futures market as well as the previously
Id. at 208.
27. Id. at 30.
28. Due to building schedules and paperwork involved in creating Ginnie Maes, the pro-
cess may take from 90 to 120 days to develop a mortgage pool and arrange for GNMA
guaranty. Id. at 10.
29. Id. at 206. A forward contract may also be referred to as a "TBA," i.e., to be an-
nounced, because certain details of the certificate are not known at the time of the sale. Id.
at 14. GNMA forward contracts must be distinguished from GNMA futures contracts, which
are standardized commodities contracts traded on a Board of Trade. In contrast to futures
contracts, forward contracts are not traded on organized exchanges, generally do not require
margin payments, and can only be terminated by agreement of both parties to the transac-
tion. The fact that trading in the forward market, unlike the futures market, may be accom-
plished without margin payment, gives rise to the ability of a mortgage banker, dealer, in-
vestor or speculator to hedge, invest, or speculate without putting up any "front" capital.
Thus, trading abuses occur in the Ginnie Mae forward market.
30. Id. at 28-32. It should be noted that the dealer's customer acquires no rights against
the mortgage banker. Under the terms of the purchase agreements, at or before the delivery
date, the mortgage banker may generally substitute securities with the same yield to matur-
ity and with a dollar price no higher than par or may buy back the original commitment. A
mortgage banker may wish to do this in order to obtain greater profit, either by selling
actual mortgages to investors or by selling for more to GNMA under its standby commit-
ment. Id. at 18.
31. Id. at 20.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. IX
described forward market.3 2 GNMA futures contracts are traded
on the Chicago Board of Trade and the AMEX Commodities Ex-
change.33 Such contracts are within the definition of the term
"commodity" in section 2(a)(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act
which includes "all services, rights and interests in which contracts
for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in."'33 The
Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") has exclusive
jurisdiction over transactions involving contracts of sale of a com-
modity for future delivery traded or executed on a contract mar-
ket.3 5 The regulation of commodity futures, not government securi-
ties, is the primary function of the CFTC. However, section 2(1) of
the 1933 Act defines the term "security" to include any right to
purchase a security." Because a GNMA futures contract is a right
to purchase a GNMA security, arguably both agencies have juris-
diction over GNMA futures contracts.3 7 This jurisdictional overlap
was the subject of correspondence between the respective Chair-
men of the SEC and CFTC in 1975.1' In this correspondence it was
noted that "if each agency follows its statute to its logical conclu-
sion, the CFTC would govern aspects of the securities industry and
the SEC would govern aspects of the commodity futures indus-
32. A futures contract is a contract traded on an organized exchange in which one party
agrees to purchase and another to sell a specified security on a future date at a specified
time. A contract for the future .delivery of Ginnie Maes traded on the Chicago Board of
Trade is defined as a futures contract. See FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, PRELIMINARY EXAMINER
QUESTIONNAIRE HUD Report, supra note 5, at Vol. II, 82.
33. Id. at 45.
34. Commodity Exchange Act of 1975, § 2(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
35. Id. Section 2(a)(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended by section 201 of
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act provides:
That the [Commodity Futures Trading] Commission shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion with respect to accounts, agreements. . . and transactions involving contracts of
sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a contract market
designated pursuant to section 7 of this title .... (emphasis added).
7 U.S.C. § 2 (1975). Then, "except as hereinabove provided," that section goes on expressly
to preserve the jurisdiction of the SEC as to other matters.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976).
37. With regard to the unambiguous jurisdictional domains of the CFTC and the SEC,
"no one at the CFTC seems seriously to believe that [for example] the stock of General
Motors or AT&T is the proper subject of a futures market, [nor would] anyone at the SEC
. . . seriously argue that pork bellies or wheat is the proper subject for stock market activ-
ity." FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 80,336, 85,871 (1975).
38. Id. 85,861-73. This jurisdictional overlap was also discussed in the congressional
hearings relating to reauthorization of the CFTC in 1978.
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try."39 The concept of "concurrent jurisdiction" as it relates to ar-
eas which fall primarily within the domain of one or the other reg-
ulatory agency was rejected by both agencies on the grounds that it
would lead to "duplication and inconsistency of regulation" as well
as encroachments upon the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of the
Commodity Exchange Act.40 The CFTC has taken the position
that "its responsibilities under the Act [are serious] and [the
CFTC] is unwilling to concede the right of any other enforcement
agency to do the job that Congress has expressly entrusted to the
CFTC.""' Accordingly, the SEC would have no right to "superim-
pose" securities law standards onto the CFTC's regulation of the
future markets. However, in recognition of the SEC's "sensitivity"
to issues raised by GNMA futures contracts on the Chicago Board
of Trade,' the CFTC stated:
notwithstanding its exclusive jurisdiction thereto, it [would] . . .consult
with the SEC on all financial instrument items. . . sought to be traded on a
futures contract market. . . . No theoretical strawman should be con-
structed to stand in the way of establishing and maintaining a cooperative
spirit of understanding between the two agencies, nor in the way of the
most effective utilization of each agency's resources and energies.'
An uneasy truce resulted, with the CFTC regulating futures con-
tracts and the SEC bringing enforcement actions relating to activi-
ties in the underlying GNMA securities.
Generally, the CFTC has been more willing than the SEC to rec-
ognize industry regulatory initiative."" It is likely that the CFTC
would assert jurisdiction over the elements of the markets for
mortgage-backed securities which are the most significant for regu-
latory purposes. In CFTC v. American Board of Trade, Inc.,45 the
39. Id. 85,871 (Supp. 1980).
40. Act of September 21, 1922, 42 Stat. 998, 7 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 1980), as amended by
Act of October 23, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389, and Act of September 30, 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865.
41. FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 80,336, 85,872 (1975)
42. See HUD Report, supra note 5, at 144-47.
43. 473 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
44. Id. at 1182.
45. Judge Vincent L. Broderick concluded:
An option involving any commodity is ... a transaction in which one purchases or,
in the case of the grantor, sells the right to enter into a transaction in that commod-
ity - the right to purchase it or sell it, at a specified date and at a fixed price. The
option transaction is a long step removed from a transaction in the commodity in-
1980]
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CFTC alleged that the Commodity Exchange Act covered com-
modity options transactions based on spot and cash markets and
transactions involving the sale of foreign currencies for future de-
livery, and that the Commission was entitled to a preliminary in-
junction against the defendants to prevent such unregistered par-
ties from engaging in transactions in violation of the Act. The
court held that transactions in options to purchase foreign cur-
rency are separate from transactions in foreign currency itself, and
are, therefore, subject to CFTC regulation even though transac-
tions in foreign currency are specifically excluded from the CFTC's
jurisdiction."' Standby commitments to purchase mortgage-backed
securities can be analogized to options and could, thereby, feasibly
come under CFTC jurisdiction.7
Additionally, the CFTC may consider a general designation of
forward contracts in GNMA securities as "leverage contracts"
which would place them under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
volved, since the option purchaser, if he or she does nothing more when the specified
date arrives, will simply see the option die. If, when the exercise date arrives, the
option holder decides to exercise the option, he or she at that point, and not before,
will engage in a transaction in the commodity involved.
In short, the Commodity Futures Trading . . . is authorized by the Commodity
Exchange Act 'to regulate transactions in actual commodities and. . transactions in
commodity options.' '[T]ransactions in foreign currency' are indeed exempted from
the Commission regulation. The exemption does not cover transactions involving the
sale of foreign currency for future delivery conducted on a board of trade, since such
transactions are specifically excepted from the exemption. Nor does the exemption
cover options involving foreign currency, which are not "transactions in foreign cur-
rency" within the meaning of the Act.
Id. at 1183 (footnote omitted).
The defendants were preliminarily enjoined:
(a) from accepting money, securities, or property (or extending credit in lieu thereof)
from any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any commodity option; (b)
from soliciting and accepting orders for the purchase or sale of commodity options
and from supervising persons so engaged, and (c) from refusing to produce for inspec-
tion by authorized representatives of the Commission records that Commission regu-
lations require be kept.
Id. at 1178.
46. Id. at 1182-83.
47. HUD Report, supra note 5, at 54. A standby contract is an option contract which
lasts for a given time period granting one party the option to deliver specified securities to a
second party at an agreed upon price. Such a contract is arranged between individual par-
ties and does not involve trading on an organized exchange. See FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD,
supra note 32.
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CFTC.," This interpretation is paralleled by SEC assertions that
forward contracts are securities and, therefore, subject to SEC ju-
risdiction. CFTC officials have been unwilling to conclude that for-
ward contracts are not leverage contracts." In order for the CFTC
to claim that GNMA forward contracts are within the CFTC's ju-
risdiction as "leverage contracts," 0 despite the exclusionary provi-
sion of section 2(a)(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act,"1 the
CFTC must argue that a transaction in a "leverage contract," like
a transaction in an option, is a transaction separate from a transac-
tion in the underlying security." '
IV. Problems in the GNMA Market; Possible
Regulation of GNMAs and Other "Exempted Securities"
Markets
Commencing in 1976, public perception of fraudulent practices
promulgated in the GNMA marketplace developed as a result of
certain practices by a small number of market participants. These
practices include misrepresentations," pyramiding schemes,5 over-
48. CFTC (CCH) 920,467 CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 77-12, Dealers in GNMA Cer-
tificates as a Board of Trade (Aug. 17, 1977) 21,910. A leverage contract constitutes:
A standardized agreement (also commonly known to the trade as a margin account,
margin contract, or leverage account) calling for delivery of a commodity with pay-
ments against the total cost spread out over a period of time. Principal characteristics
include: standard units and quality of a commodity and of terms and conditions of
the contract; payment and maintenance of margin; close out by offset or delivery (af-
ter payment in full); and no right or interest in a specific lot of the commodity.
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, GLOSSARY OF SOME TERMS COMMONLY USED IN
THE FUTURES TRADING INDUSTRY 16 (1975).
49. See Report of the Advisory Committee on Market Instruments to the CFTC on
"Recommended Policies on Futures, Forward and Leverage Contracts and Transactions"
(July 16, 1976) at v-vi.
50. See note 48 supra.
51. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
52. Immediate-delivery transactions in mortgage-backed securities have not been and
are not likely to be significant sources of regulatory concern.
53. Among the misrepresentations which have occurred in the Ginnie Mae market, the
following have been reported:
(1) You'll never have to pay for these securities. You'll sell at a guaranteed profit
before delivery is due. (2) The market is going straight up. You can't lose money on
them. (3) Don't worry about funds for delivery. If you don't have enough, we'll ar-
range financing for you, and you'll even make a profit on that. (4) This pool pays
down twice as fast as usual. At this price, your yield should be 50% higher than
standard.
HUD Report, supra note 5, at 83.
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speculation" and adjusted trading." Public attention focused on
the industry, and the resultant litigation, which highlighted the in-
adequacy of the existing legislation, raised some novel issues. In
Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. Affiliated Mortgage Investments, 57
the defendant alleged that GNMA forward contracts are separate
securities requiring registration under the 1933 Act.58 The defen-
dant's underlying rationale was that if Ginnie Mae forward con-
tracts are not futures subject to CFTC jurisdiction, then such con-
tracts themselves constitute securities, separate from the securities
to which they relate. Thus, such forward contracts would not be
entitled to Ginnie Mae's exemption from the regulatory provisions
of federal securities law. The court in rejecting this argument held
that a delayed-delivery contract in GNMA securities is a contract
to sell a security and not separate securities within the meaning of
the Securities Act of 1933.59 In noting that the defendants failed to
show that registration would reduce any of the possibilities for
speculation, the court also observed that registration would not
change the risk incurred as a result of fluctuating interest rates.
The court further concluded that the plaintiffs had clearly shown
that the registration process would impose a severe burden on the
issuers of GNMA certificates and that the impact of such a re-
quirement would be felt throughout the industry.10 Thus, this deci-
sion recognizes the formidable problems that would be involved in
attempting to apply the registration provision of the 1933 Act to a
forward contract.6 "
In SEC v. Winters Government Securities Corporation
54. Pyramiding is the practice of obtaining credit to finance a securities holding which
can in turn be financed to purchase more securities. Id. at 90.
55. Overspeculation in GNMA securities refers to the purchase of GNMA securities with
very limited equity in order to speculate on interest rates. Report to the Executive Com-
mittee of the GNMA Mortgage-Backed Securities Dealers Association, July 26, 1977 at 2.
56. Adjusted trading refers to the simultaneous purchase and sale of securities above the
market price in order to avoid realization of a loss in another transaction. HUD Report,
supra note 5, at 93-94.
57. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. Affiliated Mortgage Investments, 445 F. Supp. 644 (N.D.
Ga. 1977).
58. Id. at 646.
59. Id. at 646-47.
60. Id. at 647.
61. For example, there would be the problem of determining who was the "issuer" of the
security.
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("WGS"),12 a registered and relatively small securities dealer lo-
cated in Florida sold GNMA's to relatively unsophisticated, small
institutional investors through the use of unscrupulous and overly
aggressive tactics. The SEC charged that WGS oversold Ginnie
Maes to small institutions; WGS did not assure the suitability of
the investments made by its customers or that such investments
were within the financial capacity of an institution to honor when
due. The abuses alleged by the SEC included: (1) "churning;"63 (2)
unauthorized transactions for certain customers; (3) misrepresenta-
tions about Ginnie Maes; (4) sham accounts (which were opened at
the urging of salesmen); and (5) the inappropriate use of reverse
repurchase agreements" ' as a financing technique. When the mar-
ket price of Ginnie Maes declined due to a general increase in in-
terest rates, "automatic" profits previously taken by WGS's cus-
tomers became huge "paper losses." As a result, some customers
disavowed trades, refused delivery, or claimed that the transac-
tions were unauthorized. WGS was forced to pay forward con-
tracts, but the SEC took decisive action against WGS under the
anti-fraud provisions of the securities law.65
In the University of Houston investment fraud case,"s a low es-
chelon investment officer of the University made large forward
commitments in Ginnie Maes for the account of the University
under inadequate supervision. Relying without caution on the ex-
pected financial state of this large and prestigious University, sev-
eral prominent Ginnie Mae dealers handled the transactions with
62. No. 77-6345 (S.D. Fla., filed Aug. 15, 1977). This case involves trading abuse occur-
ring only in the GNMA forward market.
63. This is the practice of making repeated purchase and sale transactions for the pur-
pose of earning commissions or markups. See HUD Report, supra note 5, at 74.
64. Reverse repurchase agreements are the purchase of securities by a dealer under a
contract in which the purchaser makes a commitment to sell back an equivalent amount of
the securities at a specified price on a specified date, whereas repurchase agreements re-
present the sale of securities in connection with which the seller makes such a commitment.
Id. at 216. See also note 109 infra.
65. WGS was forced to close its doors when its customers failed to pay for about $6
million of government securities they bought through the firm. See "SEC Says Firm Used
Illegal Acts," Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 1977 at 12, at col. 1. Further, WGS was indebted to three
New York based government securities firms for $1.5 million. See "Debt-Ridden Ginnie
Mae Dealer Closes, Leaving Trail of Regulatory Questions," Wall St. J., May 17, 1977, at 15,
col. 1.
66. See Plaintiff's original petition, State v. Covington Knox, Inc., No. 78-19222 (D.
Tex., May 12, 1978).
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the institution. The University had contracts in Ginnie Maes (both
forwards and futures) amounting to several millions of dollars.
Many transactions were financed by pyramiding or matched repur-
chase agreements.6 7 However, due to rising interest rates which de-
pressed the price of Ginnie Maes, this financing scheme collapsed
when forward commitments could no longer be funded by pre-
viously purchased securities. The resultant loss was estimated at
greater than $17 million. 8
These widely publicized cases led to major changes in the con-
duct of Ginnie Mae dealers. Also, the publicity given to such inci-
dents of abuse caused federal and state regulators to investigate
rules and procedures designed to eliminate inappropriate invest-
ment and speculation in the Ginnie Mae market. Regulatory re-
sponses were promulgated by the Comptroller of the Currency (na-
tional banks),6  the National Credit Union Administration7 0 (credit
unions), the Federal Home Loan Bank Board7 1 (savings and loan
associations), the Federal Reserve Board72 (state member banks),
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 73 (insured non-
67. When informed that the University lacked sufficient funds to pay for proposed for-
ward contracts, in some instances the dealers offered to arrange immediate financing upon
delivery so that the University could make the purchase. See HUD Report, supra note 5, at
76.
68. At one point, the University had made forward commitments in excess of $500 mil-
lion although its available funds were a small fraction of that amount. Id. at 77.
69. Ginnie Maes are exempt from the registration requirements of the regulations of the
Comptroller of the Currency. 12 C.F.R. § 16 (1980). See Letter from Owen Carney dated
September 7, 1978, contained in HUD Report, supra note 5, Appendix III. B. at 219-22.
70. Federal credit unions are expressly authorized to invest in mortgage-backed securi-
ties by § 8(8) of the Federal Credit Union Act. Pub. L. No. 86-354, 66 Stat. 70 (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1757 (1976)). See letter from John L. Ostby, dated October 30, 1978 in HUD
Report, supra note 5, Appendix III. F. at 142-50.
71. Federal savings and loan associations may invest in mortgage-backed securities, how-
ever, such securities may not be included as "liquid assets" for the purposes of regulations
adopted by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. 12 C.F.R. § 545.9(c) (1980). See letter
from John P. Valek dated October 5, 1978 in the HUD Report, supra note 5, Appendix III.
E. at 235-42.
72. By letter dated June 1, 1970 to Woodward Kingman, President of GNMA, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ruled that member banks could invest in mort-
gage-backed securities and that such securities would be eligible as collateral for advances
by the Reserve Bank. 12 C.F.R. § 201.108 (1980); 1968 Fed. Res. Bull. 1012. See letter from
Robert S. Plotkin dated September 1, 1978 in HUD Report, supra note 5, Appendix III. C.
at 223-25.
73. Most State Regulatory Authorities have expressed opinions that banks and insur-
ance companies under their jurisdiction, may invest in mortgage-backed securities. These
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member state banks), proposing rules relating to trading in GNMA
securities by their constituents. 4 Such "back door" regulation is
significant in alleviating problems in the industry. 75
V. Initial Regulatory Efforts
Recognizing the lack of standards governing sales, the GNMA
dealer community took steps to create a self-regulatory body in an
attempt to address this deficiency. An industry organization, the
GNMA Mortgage-Backed Securities Dealers Association (the "As-
sociation"), now the Mortgage-Backed Securities Dealers Associa-
tion, began serious efforts at self-regulation. In a report dated July
26, 1977, the Rules Committee of the Association 76 recognized the
problems existing in the GNMA market and suggested the follow-
ing alternatives. The Rules Committee called for a determination
of the regulatory power of the GNMA from the Department of
Justice or HUD.7 7 If it was determined that GNMA's power was
inadequate to regulate the dealers in the market, the Rules Com-
mittee felt that legislation to authorize and' direct GNMA to regu-
late the activities of the GNMA securities issuers and dealers
should be enacted. Further, the Rules Committee suggested that
the activities of the association be expanded. 8
Ginnie Mae itself recognized the seriousness of an emerging
problem of abuse in the GNMA marketplace and the necessity of
corrective measures. The 1978 Annual Report of the Government
National Mortgage Association pointed out: "A problem of contin-
uing concern ... has been the reports of occasional trading
abuses, especially in the unregulated forward delivery markets for
GNMA securities. '7 9 The Association's self-regulatory proposals
have been evolving since November 1978 and have led to the re-
opinions are available in the GNMA Washington offices. See letter from John J. McCarthy
dated August 28, 1978 in the HUD Report, supra note 5, Appendix III. D. at 226-34.
74. For example, such agencies have proposed rules relating to record-keeping of accept-
able transactions and prohibitions on speculation intended to protect their constituencies.
75. In addition, several securities firms have independently adopted margin require-
ments for GNMA trades for certain customers.
76. GNMA Mortgage-Backed Securities Dealers Association Rules Committee, Report to
the Executive Committee, July 26, 1977.
77. Id. at 11-13. The Association noted that the hazards of this proposal were that
GNMA would not be an effective regulator or might not be responsive to industry needs.
78. Id. at 14-17.
79. Government National Mortgage Association, Annual Report 1978.
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cently enacted rule amendments.80 During this period, the follow-
ing proposals have been submitted to the Justice Department for
review: (1) membership for all dealers in mortgage-backed securi-
ties and those interested in such, including mortgage bankers; (2) a
board of directors which represents the interests of large and small
dealers, mortgage bankers and other interested parties, such as
savings and loan associations; (3) a Code of Fair Practice prohibit-
ing the types of abuses which have caused problems in the indus-
try, such as misrepresentations and adjusted trading, and imposing
a suitability and supervision requirement on all dealers, as well as
requiring dealers to determine the credit worthiness of their cus-
tomers; (4) market-to-market maintenance for all delayed-delivery
contracts in excess of 150 days (formerly 120 days); (5) uniform
confirmation, delivery and clearance procedures; (6) book and re-
cord-keeping requirements and audit procedures; (7) arbitration of
inter-member and member-customer disputes; and, (8) formal dis-
ciplinary proceedings against members alleged to have violated the
Association's rules and regulations.8 "
The Justice Department responding"' to these proposals ap-
proved the Association's self-regulatory proposal in principle, but
objected to the "market maintenance" rule which would have re-
quired members to impose uniform minimum margin requirements
on their customers in certain transactions.8 " The Justice Depart-
ment indicated that this rule could be viewed as an agreement by
80. 45 Fed. Reg. 116 (1980) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 390). Section 390. 52 effective
September 11, 1980; all other sections effective July 14, 1980.
81. Id.
82. The Department of Justice response to the proposed self-regulatory rules is con-
tained in a letter from Donald L. Flexner, Acting Assistant Attorney General (Antitrust
Division) to Victor S. Friedman, Counsel for the Mortgage-Backed Securities Dealers Asso-
ciation (June 25, 1979).
83. The uniform minimum margin rule would require a member entering into a contract
of sale for mortgage-backed securities in which the settlement date is more than four
months after the contract date to deposit along with the customer collateral equal to 100
percent of the adverse changes in the values of the securities from trade date to settlement.
To be precise, the market maintanence rule would apply to contracts calling for settlement
"later than the last day of the calendar month in which the 120th day after trade date
falls .. " The market maintenance requirement is desirable according to industry mem-
bers and regulatory agencies "because it would impress upon investors the more speculative
nature of contracts which call for settlement beyond 120 days, and because it would reduce
the prospect that the parties to the contract would not be able to make good delivery on the
settlement date." Id. at 3-4.
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Association members to impose the same margin requirement on
all parties to the contract of sale for the securities regardless of
their creditworthiness and credit needs.84
In 1978, coincident with the Association's self-regulatory propo-
sal, the Department of Housing and Urban Development commis-
sioned a private study,85 "to examine the entire market for the
trading of Ginnie Maes and to render a report on problems and
potential problems, as well as to recommend a regulatory structure
which would be effective in preventing abuses while accommodat-
ing legitimate trading practices." ' The final report, issued in Nov-
ember 1978, revealed extensive details about the GNMA market-
place and the market participants, as well as its economics and
legal and regulatory status. The HUD Report concluded that
"GNMA support the present efforts at dealer self-regulation and
that it announce its willingness to endorse a self-regulatory organi-
zation that meets the criteria we have outlined, in preference to
any of the proposals for supervision by an existing or newly cre-
ated government agency. '87 Thus, the HUD Report maintained
that GNMA should oppose regulation of the GNMA dealers by the
SEC or CFTC. The report recommended that any self-regulatory
organization in the GNMA industry should have certain character-
istics, including: (1) jurisdiction over all GNMA instruments other
than those already regulated by another entity (e.g. CFTC); (2)
open membership to all GNMA dealers; (3) a representative board
of directors; (4) a staff headed by a full-time employee of the or-
ganization; and, (5) written rules of procedure governing arbitra-
tion and disciplinary functions.88 The report further advised that
GNMA should expand its "prudent business practices" guidelines
to establish specific rules governing the relationship of issuers' for-
ward commitments to actual and anticipated mortgage lending vol-
84. Id. It is fair to conclude that the Justice Department would have significant concern
if the Association attempted to impose uniform substantive requirements on members and
indirectly to impose those requirements on non-members.
85. HUD Report, supra note 5. It should be noted that GNMA is a government corpora-
tion within HUD, created to administer mortgage support programs which could not be
carried out in the private market.
86. Id. at ix.
87. Id. at 180-83.
88. Id. at 130-33.
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ume."9 The HUD Report also advocated that GNMA educate and
encourage federal and state regulators of participants in the
GNMA market (such as the Federal Home Bank Board and the
National Credit Union) so as to better regulate the GNMA activi-
ties of their constituencies." The study further recommended that
GNMA continue to support industry self-regulatory efforts and en-
dorse any self-regulatory plan which contains certain minimum el-
ements. Further, the report urged GNMA to oppose any proposals
for federal legislation until adequate time has passed to enable as-
sessment of the effectiveness of self-regulation. The report addi-
tionally recommended that "GNMA should also oppose any legis-
lative initiative to subject the Ginnie Mae cash forward market to
new federal oversight before there has been an opportunity for a
meaningful test of self-regulation." 1 Finally, the HUD report pre-
dicted that "the basic elements of a scheme of unsupervised self-
regulation could be in place within six to nine months and that
such a plan could be implemented more rapidly than legislative
alternatives"" and if self-regulatory efforts do not succeed, a regu-
latory agency, modeled on the Municipal Securities Rule-Making
Board ("MSRB") could be the best regulatory approach.93
Industry efforts toward self-regulation sponsored initially by the
Association as previously discussed, were revitalized by the Public
Securities Association ("PSA") through the creation of PSA-Self-
Regulatory Inc. ("PSA-SRI").'
PSA-SRI functions as a rule making entity which proposes re-
quirements relating to mortgage-backed securities and govern-
89. Id. at 183.
90. Id. at 177-78.
91. Id. at 181.
92. Id. at 184.
93. Id. at 193-95. See also Dikeman, Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board: A New
Concept of Self-Regulation, 29 VAND. L. REV. 903 (1976); Wallison, Self-Regulation of the
Municipal Securities Industry, 6 SEc. REG. L.J. (1979); Comment, Federal Regulation of
Municipal Securities: A Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, DUKE L.J. 1261, 1310-19
(1976).
94. 126 CONG. REC. S3347 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 1980). The PSA is a national trade associa-
tion representing banks, dealers, and brokers that underwrite, trade, and sell U.S. govern-
ment and federal agency securities. According to its most recent 1979 Annual Report, the
Association approved the formation of an affiliate organization, PSA-SRI, to establish and
promote standards of conduct for its members who participate in the market for govern-
ment mortgage-backed securities.
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ment-guaranteed securities. PSA-SRI has published proposed rules
substantially similar to those of the Association and has become
the entity responsible for implementing industry-sponsored self-
regulation in the GNMA industry." It has been pointed out that
the PSA-SRI (and Association) rules were drafted with the objec-
tive of avoiding antitrust problems." The rules do not contain in-
ducements to membership which would assure that the class of
nonmembers would be negligible. The antitrust concerns are ad-
dressed in the following manner: (1) the critical rule regarding au-
dit procedures, suitability, supervision, risk disclosure and
financial responsibility do not apply to nonmembers; (2) the rules
do not require that the records and procedures adopted by mem-
bers be uniform; (3) the rules do not establish standards by which
the reasonableness of such records and procedures could be judged;
(4) PSA-SRI has not established a systematic inspection program
to monitor compliance with the rules of any records or procedures
adopted by the members under the rules.
In addition to the delays in the industry regulatory efforts, the
need was recognized for serious consideration of the Justice De-
partment decision that although the regulations proposed by the
industry are compatible with the antitrust laws, the imposition of
uniform margin requirements by a private self-regulatory organiza-
tion would raise serious questions under the Sherman Act.97
GNMA has also recognized the problems inherent in self-regula-
tory efforts.9" The Executive Vice President of GNMA indicated
that GNMA has grown "impatient" with industry self-regulatory
efforts. GNMA cited as problems with the program, the lack of
margin rules and the need to persuade all GNMA dealers to abide
by the rules." GNMA further indicated that it saw no role for
95. PSA-SRI has recruited members and a code of conduct has been developed with the
cooperation, but not the approval of federal agencies. Presently, PSA-SRI has approxi-
mately thirty members, primarily broker-dealers. Despite some early confusion about the
respective roles of the Association and PSA-SRI, PSA-SRI has assumed the rulemaking and
rule enforcement role in the industry, although the Association continues to exist.
96. 126 CONG. REC. S3347-48 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 1980).
97. See letter from Donald L. Flexner, Acting Assistant Attorney General (Antitrust Di-
vision), to Victor S. Friedman, Esq., Counsel for the Mortgage-Backed Securities Dealers
Association, (June 25, 1979).
98. See letter from Fred Taylor to Harrison Williams, Jr., United States Senator (Aug.
31, 1979).
99. See letter from Fred Taylor to Roger P. Shay, Chairman PSA Self Regulation, Inc.
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GNMA as part of HUD to regulate trading in Ginnie Maes; HUD's
role is only to administer the issuance of Ginnie Maes. It has been
acknowledged that there must be regulation of trading in mort-
gage-backed securities and that the SEC is the appropriate regula-
tory body.100
Further acknowledging the need for an SEC response, on April
17, 1979, Senator Harrison Williams requested SEC assistance in
determining the need for and the framework of possible additional
legislation to regulate dealers in GNMA securities and other fed-
eral government-guaranteed securities. 01 In his response to Sena-
tor Williams, SEC Chairman Williams acknowledged the need for
some regulation of the market.102 He stated that the system cre-
ated for the regulation of municipal securities professionals, in-
cluding a self-regulatory organization with primary rule-making
authority, suggested itself as a model for the regulation of the mar-
ket for mortgage-backed securities. Further, Chairman Williams
referred in his letter to an increasing number of abuses in the
mortgage-backed securities market and cited several SEC investi-
gations.10 3 Chairman Williams indicated that many of the practices
in these cases were comparable to those which were present in the
(Aug. 15, 1979).
100. Id.
101. See letter from Harrison A. Williams, Jr., United States Senator to Harold M. Wil-
liams, Chairman, Securities & Exchange Comm'n (Apr. 17, 1979).
102. See letter from Harold M.-Williams, Chairman Securities & Exchange Comm'n to
Harrison A. Williams, Jr., United States Senator (July 9, 1979).
103. See Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Trans-American Gov't Sec., Inc., No. 79-2163
(W.D. Tenn. Mar. 9, 1979) (involving adjusted trading); Securities & Exchange Comm'n v.
Harwell, No. 78-1916 (S.D. Texas Oct. 5, 1978) (the so-called "University of Houston" case,
involving interpositioning, pyramiding, and excessive fees); Securities & Exchange Comm'n
v. Fidelity Sec., Inc., No. 78-2410 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 15, 1978) (involving adjusted trading,
which is the simultaneous sale and purchase of different securities above the market price in
order to avoid a loss in the security being sold, and excessive fees); Securities & Exchange
Comm'n v. American Bankshares Corp., No. 77-750 (E.D. Wisc. Nov. 21, 1977) (involving
adjusted trading and resultant false financial statements); In the Matter of First Nat'l Bank
of Chicago Bond, File No. 3-5316 (Nov. 10, 1977) (the companion case to American Bank-
shares above); Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Financial Corp., No. 75-3391 (S.D.N.Y.,
July 9, 1975) (involving inability to meet obligations of repurchase agreements); Securities &
Exchange Comm'n v. Russell, Kennedy and Hodgen, Inc., No. 77-1080 (S.D. Texas July 8,
1977) (involving Ponzi-like schemes using repurchase agreements); In the Matter of Michael
J. Kratze, File No. 3-5231 (May 24, 1977) (involving interpositioning); and In the Matter of
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 115i5 (July 2, 1975)
(involving unsuitability).
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municipal securities market and which led to regulation of that
market.10 4 Chairman Williams also alluded to the fact that any leg-
islative solution should recognize that the jurisdiction of the SEC
and the CFTC currently overlap in a manner which has the poten-
tial for impeding effective regulation. Chairman Williams' view is
that the regulatory and enforcement authority over trading of all
futures based on securities should be integrated in one agency.
The SEC also is attempting to expand its jurisdiction over vari-
ous GNMA related instruments. According to Chairman Wil-
liams,1 5 the SEC maintains that standby and forward contracts for
mortgage-backed securities are securities subject to the SEC's ex-
isting jurisdiction."' Moreover, in a recent release,0 the SEC an-
nounced a general statement of policy with regard to the legal im-
plications under the Investment Company Act of 1940108 of
forward contracts, reverse repurchase agreements' 0 ' and standby
commitments"0 entered into by registered investment companies.
The release indicated that such devices might be deemed securities
104. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND
URBAN AFFAIRS, S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1975). In the absence of industry
initiative suggesting another pattern of regulation, it is most likely that federal legislation
will authorize SEC regulation of the area. See also Note, Municipal Bonds and the Federal
Securities Laws: The Result of Forty Years of Indirect Regulation, 23 VAND. L. REv. 561,
582-86 (1975).
105. See note 101 supra.
106. See notes 28-29 supra.
107. "Securities Trading Practices of Registered Investment Cos.," 44 Fed. Reg. 25,128-
34 (1979) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 271 (1980)).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 80 (1976).
109. In a reverse repurchase agreement, the investment company borrows money; in a
repurchase agreement, the investment company lends money. 44 Fed. Reg. 25,129 n.2. In a
typical investment company reverse repurchase agreement, an investment company is the
record owner of a Ginnie Mae. The investment company transfers possession of the Ginnie
Mae to another party (often a broker/dealer or a bank) in return for a percentage of the
value of the Ginnie Mae, usually 90-97% of its market value, but retains record ownership
and the right to receive interest and principal payments on the Ginnie Mae. At an agreed-
upon future date, the investment company repurchases the Ginnie Mae so transferred by
remitting the proceeds plus interest. 44 Fed. Reg. 25,129 (1979).
110. The standby commitment agreement is a delayed delivery agreement in which the
investment company contractually binds itself to accept delivery of a Ginnie Mae with a
stated price and fixed yield upon the exercise of an option held by the other party to the
agreement at a stated future date. The investment company receives an individually negoti-
ated, non-refundable commitment fee in consideration for its agreement to "standby" to
purchase the Ginnie Mae. Id. at 25,131.
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under the 1940 Act.11' This would appear to open the door to simi-
lar assertions in other situations." 2
V1. The Williams Bill
A comprehensive governmental regulatory pattern requires legis-
lation. Thus, on April 1, 1980, Senator Harrison Williams, intro-
duced legislation "to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and for other purposes.'" Senator Williams' bill represents an
artful compromise.1 14 The Government-Guaranteed Securities Acts
Amendments of 1980, ("Williams bill") is intended to perform
three functions. First, the bill would "amend the Federal securities
laws to require the registration of brokers and dealers in certain
Government guaranteed securities with, and permit their regula-
tion by, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the bank
regulatory agencies."' 5 Second, the Williams bill would "establish
the Government Securities Rulemaking Board ("GSRB"), a seven-
member self-regulatory organization to exercise primary rule-mak-
ing authority with respect to such dealers to promote just and eq-
111. The SEC focused on certain trading practices engaged in by open-end investment
companies, generally known as the reverse repurchase agreement, the firm commitment, and
the standby commitment agreement. Such practices raised serious questions as to whether
they involved the issuance of senior securities by the investment companies, and thus, are
either prohibited by, or subject to the asset coverage requirement of section 18(f)(1) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f)(1) (1976). This section provides, in
part, that it shall be unlawful for any registered open-end investment company to issue any
class of senior security of which it is the issuer, except that the investment company shall be
permitted to borrow from any bank, provided that immediately after any such borrowing
there shall be an asset coverage of at least 300 per centum for all borrowings of the invest-
ment company as computed under section 18(h) of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(h) (1976).
These practices may have similar effects on closed-end investment companies, which are
also subject to restrictions on their capital structure under section 18. For example, section
18(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(a) (1976), makes it unlawful for a closed-end investment
company to issue senior securities unless asset coverage and other requirements are met.
112. One may contrast the Commission's amicus brief in Securities & Exchange Comm'n
v. Winters Government Securities Corp. (S.D. Fla., Civ. Action. No. 77-6345). In arguing
against CFTC jurisdiction over the case, the Commission argued that delayed delivery con-
tracts are not futures contracts. This discussion implied that in the Commission's view a
delayed delivery contract is not an instrument apart from the sale of the GNMAs, and thus
is not a separate security.
113. See note 101 supra.
114. S 2512, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. (1980).
115. 126 CONG. REC. S 3346 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 1980). However, the Williams bill was
widely feared by the industry for the wide latitude accorded the SEC.
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uitable principles of trade and ethical business practices."" 6 Third,
this legislation would "encourage the creation of a centralized
clearing facility open to all participants in this marketplace.11 7
Senator Williams acknowledges the industry-wide concerns about
government intervention, recognizing both that the federal govern-
ment lacks the expertise to oversee this market, and that there is a
legitimate fear of interference with the "national operations" of
the market and of inappropriate expansion of the federal govern-
ment. However, federal regulation of the dealer community re-
mains the sole solution in light of the present need to "restore a
high degree of integrity, professionalism, and investor confidence
to this marketplace and to protect the financial interest of the fed-
eral government in both its guarantee and its ability to market
successfully its securities."1 "
In considering the Williams bill, the interrelation between the
GSRB and the SEC must be examined. The Williams bill proposes
116. S 2512, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. at 13-22 (1980). Senator Williams outlines three catego-
ries of dealers in government-guaranteed securities for the purposes of his legislation:
First, dealers who engage in a full line of securities activities; second, dealers who
trade only in U.S. Government securities, and who may be subsidiaries or affiliates of
firms engaged in other securities activities, and third, banks.
117. Id. at 34-35. The initial Board members would be appointed by the SEC after con-
sultation with the Treasury, the FDIC, the Comptroller of the Currency and the President
of GNMA to serve for two years and adopt rules governing their succession.
According to the background of this bill, a partial list of the areas subject to the GSRB's
regulation would include (1) prevention of fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices
and protection of just and equitable principles of trade; (2) establishment of standards for
entry into the public securities business; (3) fair dealings with investors; (4) regulation of
selling and under writing practices; (5) creation of procedures for arbitration of intra-indus-
try disputes; (6) determination of the frequency and scope of intra-industry disputes; (7)
and determination of the frequency and scope of inspection of public securities dealers by
the bank regulatory authorities with respect to banks, and the National Association of Se-
curities Dealers with respect to securities firms; and (8) suitability, markup, excessive trans-
actions authorization and acceptance of accounts. Id.
118. Id. at 45-49. As defined in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the term "clearing
agency" means any person who acts as an intermediary in making payments or deliveries or
both in connection with securities transactions or who provides facilities for comparing data
respecting the terms of settlement of securities transactions. Under the existing law, there is
no statutory mandate to either encourage movement toward a centralized clearing agency
for government-guaranteed securities or to empower the SEC or any other agency of govern-
ment to regulate such a facility. The Williams bill proposes to expand the SEC's authority
under § 17A of the Exchange Act to facilitate the development of a national system of
clearance and settlement for transactions in government-guaranteed securities. The need for
a central clearing house in this market has been also suggested by PSA and many individual
firms. 126 CONG. REC. S 3352 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 1980).
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to require and empower the Commission to review GSRB proposed
rules to discharge its duties "to insure that the [GSRB's] rules are
in conformity with the public interest and applicable statutory
standards." ' However, the Commission would not have the au-
thority to alter or supplement the existing rules of the GSRB.'2 0
The Commission is vested with certain "police powers" to the ex-
tent of "censuring any member or employee of the Board who had
willfully violated any provision of the Act, the rules thereunder, or
rules of the Board, or had willfully abused his authority.""
In several significant ways, the Williams bill departs from the
existing treatment of the Multiple Securities Rulemaking Board
("MSRB")1. 2 and the municipal securities market under the 1934
Act. First, in conformity with present law, the Williams bill consol-
idates the statutory treatment of business organizations that may
be engaged in several securities activities, including municipal as
well as Government securities. Further, concerning GSRB's delib-
erations, the Williams bill would require that prior to filing a pro-
posed rule with the SEC, the GSRB would be required to request
and consider the views of the Treasury Department and any other
Government agency that issues or guarantees such securities. 28 Fi-
nally, the Williams bill would expressly permit national securities
exchanges to administer and enforce against their members the
rules of the GSRB, subject to the SEC's authority to allocate these
functions among the various exchanges and the NASD. Moreover,
in recognition of the special interest of the Secretary of the Trea-
sury, the bill empowers the Secretary with the authority to desig-
nate the particular guaranteed securities to be subjected to the
provisions of the Act that would be added by this bill. 2 4
119. Id. at 3350.
120. S 2512, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. at 61-64 (1980).
121. In this respect, the SEC's general powers over the Board would be extensive but
somewhat different than those the Commission has over the other self-regulatory organiza-
tions under the Exchange Act. Id.
122. "Creation of the MSRB was mandated by the Securities Acts amendments of 1975.
These amendments were designed, in part, to regulate for the first time, dealers in munici-
pal securities. The 1975 amendments had been enacted because many of the trading prac-
tices currently prevalent in the Ginnie Mae Market were occurring in the municipal securi-
ties market." Doron Bar-Levan, Trading Abuses in Ginnie Maes, 8 SEc. REG. L.J. No. 42, 67
n.113 (1980).
123. S2512, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 48 (1980).
124. Id. at 2. Another significant change from the present law is that these amendments
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In contrast to the Williams bill, a joint regulatory study of the
government securities markets undertaken by the Treasury, the
Federal Reserve Board and the SEC "' advanced the following
scheme for government securities regulation: first, creation of the
Federal Mortgage-Backed Securities Rulemaking Board
("FMBSRB"), a Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board-type
agency which would be composed of industry officials and public
representatives; 126 second, creation of an oversight council of three
agency heads or their appointees which would possess approval
powers over board rules (it was suggested that this authority be
delegated to the SEC);12 third, mandatory membership in the Se-
curities Investor Protection Corp. for Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac
dealers;12 8 and finally, SEC enforcement authority with reliance on
the National Association of Securities Dealers, exchanges and bank
regulators to conduct their own investigations.2 9 While congres-
sional interest in legislation regulating GNMAs is significant, the
Senate Banking Committee staff has indicated a "strong willing-
ness to conduct hearings this year on the Ginnie Mae bill proposed
would enable the Federal Reserve Board to establish appropriate margin requirements for
transactions in government-guaranteed securities.
125. Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker was responding to Senator Williams' request for
input in undertaking this study. A draft copy of this joint study's recommendations has
been under study by the Office of Management and Budget and the Antitrust Division of
the Justice Department since mid-June 1980. The information cited in this Note is derived
from a summary of that draft copy published in Securities Week in a special issue dated
September 24, 1980.
126. Id. The joint study's draft recommendations would require legislative action. Fur-
ther, adherence to FMBSRB rules would be mandatory for dealers in GNMA-guaranteed
securities and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. ("FHLMC") obligations. Initially, the
Board would have authority over no other aspects of the government market.
127. It has been suggested that this authority be delegated to the SEC. The council
would have to gain GNMA and FHLMC input, although the two agencies would have no
authority. Dealers would be required to register with the council, through the SEC initially.
128. The FHLMC ("Freddie Mac") created by Congress in 1970 and wholly owned by
the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB's), has as its primary goal the development of a
national secondary market in conventional mortgages. Generally, FHLMC purchases con-
ventional mortgage loans from savings and loan associations (four-fifths of its total
purchases), mutual savings banks, commerical banks, and mortgage banks.
At first, FHLMC purchased mainly participations and whole loans for its own portfolio,
financing the acquisitions by borrowing from the Treasury, the FHLB's and by issuing its
own mortgage-backed bonds. In 1974, however, the focus of its operation was shifted toward
the sale of mortgage participation certificates (PC's) and guaranteed mortgage certificates
(GMC's). 126 CONG. REc. S3346-47 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 1980).
129. Further, the SEC would have to consult with the council before instituting actions.
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by Senator Williams with or without the tri-agency document.180
VII. Conclusion
As a result of the problems in the GNMA securities market, an
amendment of section 15 of the 1934 Act to require registration of
brokers and dealers selling mortgage-backed securities and/or
other exempted securities constitutes a realistic goal in light of the
proposed legislative amendment. Such an amendment would have
significant impact if it required brokers and dealers who deal in
now exempt securities to register and be subject to net capital re-
quirements, including percent trimmings of 0.3% on government
securities, book and records requirements, and segregation require-
ments. This would have broad implications for the government se-
curities market, which has traditionally been free of direct govern-
ment supervision. Additionally, there exists the possibility of
special net capital cuts on forward commitments in government se-
curities. Further, the enforcement of possible margin requirements
(Regulation T)131 on exempted securities or forward commitments
in exempted securities would also require legislative action. A mar-
gin requirement on mandatory commitments or optional commit-
ments could have a substantial effect on the GNMA commitment
program. The passage of legislation requiring registration under
the 1933 Act of presently exempted securities or forward commit-
ments in exempted securities is unlikely; registration does not ad-
dress the problems in the mortgage-backed securities market, but
it cannot be totally ruled out. Finally, the issue of whether the
dealer market in GNMA securities is a Board of Trade must be
dealt with comprehensively. 2 If so, it is arguable that the CFTC
could assert jurisdiction over transactions in GNMA forwards.
Janice L. D'Arrigo
130. Securities Week, Sept. 24, 1980, Special Issue.
131. Regulation T is the Federal Reserve Board's regulation governing the amount of
credit that brokers and dealers may extend to customers who buy securities. HUD Report,
supra note 5, at 216.
132. In a letter dated August 17, 1977, Richard E. Nathan (General Counsel of CFTC)
discusses this issue but does not resolve it because of inadequate information. CFTC (CCH)
920,467, CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 77-12, "Dealers in GNMA Certificates as a Board of
Trade," Aug. 17, 1977, 21,909-12.
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